Influence Networks in International Relations by Minhas, Shahryar et al.
INFLUENCE NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SHAHRYAR MINHAS, PETER D. HOFF, AND MICHAEL D. WARD
ABSTRACT. Measuring influence and determining what drives it are persistent questionsin political science and in network analysis more generally. Herein we focus on the do-main of international relations. Our major substantive question is: How can we deter-mine what characteristics make an actor influential? To address the topic of influence,we build on a multilinear tensor regression framework (MLTR) that captures influencerelationships using a tensor generalization of a vector autoregression model. Influencerelationships in that approach are captured in a pair of n×nmatrices and provide mea-surements of how the network actions of one actor may influence the future actionsof another. A limitation of the MLTR and earlier latent space approaches is that thereare no direct mechanisms through which to explain why a certain actor is more or lessinfluential than others. Our new framework, social influence regression, provides a wayto statistically model the influence of one actor on another as a function of character-istics of the actors. Thus we can move beyond just estimating that an actor influencesanother to understanding why. To highlight the utility of this approach, we apply it tostudying monthly-level conflictual events between countries as measured through theIntegrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) event data project.
Date: June 29, 2017.
Shahryar Minhas and Michael D. Ward acknowledge support from National Science Foundation
(NSF) Award 1259266 and Peter D. Hoff acknowledges support from NSF Award 1505136.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
09
07
2v
1 
 [s
tat
.A
P]
  2
7 J
un
 20
17
Influence Networks June 29, 2017
MOTIVATION
The concepts of power and influence are gold-standard building blocks in analyses of world
politics. Well-known debates on these blocks in early works include Von Clausewitz (1832); Haas
(1953); Fucks (1965); Keohane and Nye (1977); Baldwin (1978); Rummel (1979); Waltz (1979). In
the 1980s and 1990s, scholars also struggled with the meaning of power and influence in world
affairs (Doran and Parsons, 1980; Keohane, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). This continues
to the present as scholars look forward as well as backward into history (Kadera, 2001; Barnett
and Duvall, 2004; Nexon, 2009). Despite the nearly ubiquitous use of the concept of power,
and its derivative concept influence, there is no agreed upon way to assess this feature of world
politics. Indeed not only is there no agreement on how to measure this concept, there is little
agreement on exactly what it means conceptually. Is power based on military capabilities?
On, diplomatic prowess? The notions of power and influence imply relations among political
actors such as countries, and as such they may be best thought of a relational characteristics
rather than material ones. Herein we address a way of examining one type of influence within
a specific network framework. The ability of one actor in world politics to influence another is
intimately tied to other actors in the world. Sometimes it is quite overt as when the US calls for
China to influence North Korea. Other times these linkages and dependencies may be more
diffuse and spread out, as when a coalition of 31 countries influence Iraq to withdraw its forces
from Kuwait. We develop a network approach to show how these kinds of dependencies can
be studied.
Relational data defines connections between pairs of actors – also known as dyads. These
connections can take the shape of simple undirected, binary relations observed for a snapshot
in time to complex types of directed and weighted relations that are observed longitudinally.
The study of these types of relations is almost ubiquitous in scholarly work. In genetics, re-
searchers have defined actors as proteins and links as the bonds between them (Wu et al., 2009;
Welch, Bansal and Hunter, 2011; Livi et al., 2016). Whereas in the social sciences, researchers
have applied network analysis to the study of terrorist networks, legislators in Congress, and
the diffusion of civil wars (de Bie et al., 2017; Cho and Fowler, 2010; Metternich, Minhas and
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Ward, 2015). The study of these types of data is made more interesting by the possibility that
the relations observed do not arise or evolve independent of one another. Observations in
relational data may be simultaneously dependent on all other observations due to the social
ties and pathways that give shape to the global structure in which actors are embedded. This
dependence is why many study relational data not as a set of independent dyadic observa-
tions, but as a network in which the link between a pair of actors influences and is influenced
by other dyads. Characterizing the manner in which observations are interdependent and then
using those interdependencies to examine the emergence and evolution of a network is a prin-
cipal focus of social network analysis.
A popular approach framework through which to characterize interdependencies are latent
variablemodels, such as the latent class (Snijders and Nowicki, 1997), distance (Hoff, Raftery and
Handcock, 2002), and factor models (Hoff, 2005). Each of these model broader patterns—such
as homophily and stochastic equivalence—as a function of node-specific latent variables. These
approaches are effective at characterizing influence patterns that emerge in the network, but
they are only able to explain those patterns through endogenous explanations. For example,
actors that cluster together in the Euclidean space estimated from latent distance models or
that are assigned to similar blocks by latent class models are assumed to possess some set of
similar characteristics based on dependence patterns in the network. Yet, these approaches
leave unanswered the question of what those characteristics are?
To address this broader question, we build on the bilinear network autoregression model in-
troduced by Hoff (2015) and Minhas, Hoff and Ward (2016). At its core, this approach is a vector
autoregression model extended to handle relational data. Within this approach dependen-
cies between observations are captured by a pair of n × n matrices that measure sender- and
receiver-level influence patterns. Themodel takes the following form: yij,t =∑ aii′bjj′xi′j′,t−1+
eij . The term ai,i′ captures how previous actions of i′ affect those of i and bj,j′ shows how ac-
tions towards target j are influenced by prior actions toward j′. To characterize influence pat-
terns via a set of exogenous attributes we rewrite the influence parameters so that they depend
2
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on covariates. This enables us to reduce the bilinear model into a rank one regression model:
yij,t = α
′Xij,t−1β + eij that we refer to as the social influence regression (SIR) model.1
The simplification of the bilinear autoregression model allows us to incorporate actor and
dyad-level covariate information into determining influence patterns within the network. We
apply this approach to data from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) event data
project. The ICEWS event data are constructed by applying natural language processing and
graph theory techniques (Boschee, Natarjan and Weischedel, 2013) to a corpus of about 30
million media reports from about 275 local and global news sources in or translated to English.
Each media report is coded in accordance with an ontology of events that is derived from the
Conflict and Median Event Observation (CAMEO) scheme (Schrodt, Gerner and Yilmaz, 2009).
Our focus for this project is centered around modeling monthly level material conflict events
as tracked by ICEWS. With the SIR model we can estimate the extent to which actors within
the material conflict network influence one another, and, for example, explore whether or not
characteristics such as a pair of countries being allied is related to the influence of one on
another. Finally, we show that this network-based approach to understanding the evolution of
the material conflict network has substantially better out-of-sample performance than extant
approaches employed in the literature.
METHODS
Bilinear network autoregressionmodel. Many studies examine the flows or linkages among
actors, such as whether two countries are in a conflict with one another. Data from such studies
can be thought of relational data which is often represented in the form of a matrix as shown
in Figure 1. This matrix n × n where n denotes the number of actors in the network. The off-
diagonals of represent the interaction that took place between two actors, so yij represents
an interaction that took place between actors i and j. In the case of undirected data, this
1Rank regression (Izenman, 1975) is an approach to regression for data that do not conform to thenormal Gaussian assumptions. In contrast to standard approaches, a Rank Regression imposes no realdistributional assumptions on the underlying data. In particular rank regression bases its calculationson information about the ranks of the dependent variables. This also makes the resultant models lesssensitive to outliers in the data, in the same way that the median is less influenced by outliers than themean. 3
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may simply be an indicator that i and j are allied to one another. For directed data, the rows
designate the senders of a particular action and the columns the receiver, so the yij entry
would represent an action sent from i → j. The diagonals are typically undefined indicating
that actors do not interact with themselves.
Yt =

i . . . j . . . k
i NA . . . yji . . . yik... ... . . . ... . . . ...
j yji . . . NA . . . yjk... ... . . . ... . . . ...
k yki . . . ykj . . . NA

Figure 1. Matrix represen-tation of a dyadic, rela-tional measure for one timepoint.
Figure 2. Array representa-tion of a longitudinal dyadicmeasure. Darker shadingindicates later time periods.
Figure 1 represents the interactions that take place between actors for a snapshot in time.
In many fields, such as international relations, a single cross-section of data is insufficient, and
we observe a time series of interactions between countries. Extending network approaches to
studying longitudinal networks has become a topic of recent attention (Snijders, 2014; Krivit-
sky and Handcock, 2014; Sewell and Chen, 2015; Schein et al., 2015). To represent longitudinal
network structures, we begin by binding adjacency matrices into an array (see Figure 2). Specif-
ically, let Y = {Yt : t = 1, . . . , T} be a time series of sociomatrices of relational data where T
represents the number of time points, and the dimensions of this object are n × n × T . Esti-
mating models on structures such as these is the focus of the bilinear autoregression model.
The basis of this approach is a first-order vector autoregression model in which we regress the
network at one point in time on its lag. The parameters that captures the relationship between
them are a pair of matrices that capture sender and receiver dependence patterns for each
pair.
More concretely, a generalized bilinear autoregression model for Y is given: 4
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E[yi,j,t] = g(µi,j,t)
{µi,j,t} =Mt = AXtB>
{µi,j,t} = a>i Xtbj
where xi,j,t is a function of yi,j,t, such as x˜i,j,t ∼ log(yi,j,t−1 + 1).
In the next section we explore an example with count data. Therein Y is a time series of
matrices of counts of events between actors. Accordingly, we model yi,j,t ∼ Poisson(eµi,j,t),
where x˜i,j,t = log(yi,j,t−1 + 1). The basis of this framework is still a generalized bilinear model
so this approach is readily extendable to other distribution types. A and B are n× n “influence
parameters.” The value of aii′ captures how predictive the actions of country i′ at time t − 1
are of the actions of country i at time t, while the value of bjj′ captures how predictive the
actions directed at country j′ at time t− 1 are of the actions directed towards country j at time
t. For example, consider a bilinear autoregression model on conflict that includes the United
Kingdom (GBR) and the United States of America (USA). If we estimate that aGBR,USA is greater
than zero, this implies that countries the USA initiated/continued a conflict with in period t− 1
are likely to also face a conflict from GBR in period t. Thus, GBR’s future actions are influenced
by the USA, or, put more concretely, actions of the USA are predictive of GBR’s.
Social influence regression. The SIR model explains the influence in terms of covariates and
allows us to determine what makes an actor influential. Particularly, to determine the charac-
teristics of i or i′ that are related to the influence aii′ , we consider a linear regression model
for aii′ and bjj′ , given by aii′ = α>wii′ and bjj′ = β>wjj′ , where wii′ is a vector of nodal and
dyadic covariates specific to pair ii′ that we are using to estimate influence. The application we
present in the following section has time-varying covariates, which this model is able to account
for through time varying influence parameters: aii′t = α>wii′t and bjj′t = β>wjj′t.
The network autoregression model can be expressed as: 5
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µi,j,t =
∑
i′j′
aii′txi′j′tbjj′t =
∑
i′j′
α>wii′txi′j′tw>jj′tβ
= α>
∑
i′j′
xi′j′twii′tw
>
jj′t
β = α>X˜ijtβ
Typically, yi,j,t also has covariates. For example, we might want to condition estimation of
the parameters on a lagged version of the dependent variable, yi,j,t−1, a measure of reciprocity,
yj,i,t−1, and other exogenous variables. In the case of estimating a model on material conflict
between a pair of countries, this might include other exogenous aspects such as the geograph-
ical distance between a pair of countries. These additional exogeneous parameters can be
accommodated with a model of the form:
µi,j,t = θ
>zi,j,t + α>X˜ijtβ,
where zi,j,t represents the design array incorporating parameters that may have a direct
effect on the dependent variable. The model presented here is a type of low-rank matrix
regression: it regresses the outcome yij,t on the matrix Xij,t. An unconstrained (linear) re-
gression would be expressed as µij,t = θ>zij,t + 〈C,Xij,t〉, where C is an arbitrary p × p ma-
trix of regression coefficients to be estimated. In contrast, the regression specified above re-
stricts C to be rank one, that is, expressible as C = αβ>. This follows from the identity that
〈αβ>, Xij,t〉 = α>Xij,tβ. Low rank matrix regression models have been considered by Li, Kim
and Altman (2010) and Zhou, Li and Zhu (2013).
Estimation. To estimate the parameters, {θ, α, β} we employ an iterative process because the
model is bilinear. Specifically, for a fixed β the model is linear in (θ, α). For fixed α the model is
linear in (θ, β). Hence: 6
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µi,j,t = (θ
> α>)
 zi,j,t
X˜ijtβ

= (θ> β>)
 zi,j,t
X˜>ijtα

Maximum likelihood estimate can be obtained with an iterative block coordinate descent
method for estimation of θ, α and β. Given initial values of β, iterate the following until conver-
gence:
(1) Find the conditional maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of (θ, α) given β using iterative
weighted least squares (IWLS);
(2) Find the conditional MLE of (θ, β) given α using IWLS.
Using this approach the problem of finding the conditional MLEs turns into a sequence of low
dimensional generalized linear model (GLM) optimizations.2 For example, let n be the number
of nodes, p be the length of each wii′ vector, and q be the length of each zij,t vector. Then step
one from above can be implemented as follows:
(a) Let x˜ij,t be the vector of length p+ q obtained by concatenating zij,t andXij,tβ.
(b) Construct the matrix X˜ having n× (n− 1)× T rows and p+ q columns, where each row is
equal to x˜ij,t for some (directed) pair i, j at time t.
(c) Let y be the vector of length n × (n − 1) × T consisting of the entries of Y = {Y1, . . . , YT },
ordered to correspond to the rows of X˜ .
(d) Obtain the MLEs for the Poisson regression of y on X˜ . From the regression coefficients,
extract the (conditional) estimates of θ and α.
Step 2 of the iterative algorithm works similarly, by replacingXij,tβ in item (a) withX>ij,tα.
Inference. Approximate standard errors and confidence intervals for the parameters can be
obtained from the derivatives of the log-likelihood function at the MLE. This claim, however,
2Implementing this type of model is relatively straightforward using base functions such as glm instatistical software such as R, but the code to run these type of models is available in a package that willbe hosted on CRAN and/or the corresponding author’s github. 7
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comes with a caveat: The multiplicative parameters α and β are not identifiable, as the term
α>Xβ is the same as (α/c)>X(cβ) for any scalar c. Meaningful derivative-based standard er-
rors need to be derived from an identifiable parameterization of the model. An identifiable
parameterization may be obtained by placing a scale restriction on α or β, or fixing one ele-
ment of either. The identifiable parameterization employed herein restricts the first element of
α to be one.
Log-likelihood derivatives of the identifiable parameters may be obtained by calculating the
derivatives for the unconstrained, non-identifiable parameterization, and then using the chain
rule to obtain the derivatives for the constrained, identifiable case. Let H be the matrix of
second derivatives of the log-likelihood at the MLE ψˆ of ψ = (θ, α, β) (using an identifiable
parameterization). An estimate of the variance of ψˆ is given by H−1, and standard errors for ψˆ
are given by the square roots of the diagonal elements fofH−1. The asymptotic validity of these
standard errors relies upon the assumption that the underlying model is correct. Alternatively,
model-robust standard errors can be obtained using a Sandwich variance estimate,
V̂ar(ψˆ) = H−1SH−1
where the matrix S is given by
∑
i,j,t
(yi,j,t − µi,j,t)L˙ij,tL˙>ij,t,
with L˙ij,t denoting the derivative of the log-likelihood corresponding to the single observa-
tion yij,t. In the application that follows we utilize model-robust standard errors.
Figure 3 provides a visual summary of this model. The array in the far left represents the
network being modeled, the design array in green represents explanatory variables used to
directly model linkages between dyads, and the θ vector includes the estimates of the effect
those variables have on the network. To capture dependence patterns, a logged and lagged
8
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version of dependent variable are included, along with a design array containing a set of in-
fluence covariates,W ; α and β are vectors that capture parameter estimates for the effects of
those influence covariates. A benefit of this framework is that once estimated, linear combi-
nations of the influence regression parameters permit visualization the resulting sender and
receiver dependence patterns in the network.
Figure 3. Visual summary of social influence regression model.
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
ICEWS Material Conflict. Over the past few years, a number of projects have arisen seeking
to create large data sets of dyadic events through the automatic extraction of information from
on-line news archives. This has made it empirically easier to study interactions among coun-
tries, as well as among actors such as NGOs within countries.
The two most well-known developments include the ICEWS event data project (Boschee
et al., 2015a) and the Phoenix pipeline (OEDA, 2016). At present, the field of event data is
evolving, but ICEWS remains the gold standard. For the purposes of this project we focus
on utilizing the ICEWS database which also extends back farther in time. ICEWS draws from
over 300 different international and national focused publishers (Boschee et al., 2015b). The
ICEWS event data are based on a continuous monitoring of over 250 news sources and other9
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open source material covering 177 countries worldwide. ICEWS consists of several compo-
nents, including a database of over 38 million multilingual news stories going back to 1990
and present to last week. The ICEWS data along with extensive documentation have been
made publicly available (with a one year embargo) on dataverse.org (Lautenschlager, Shell-
man and Ward, 2015; Boschee et al., 2015a). To classify news stories into socio-political topics,
ICEWS relies on a augmented and expanded version of the CAMEO coding scheme (Schrodt,
Gerner and Yilmaz, 2009). The dictionaries, aggregations, ground truth data, and actor and
verb dictionaries are publicly available with a one year lag at the ICEWS data repository https:
//dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/icews. In addition, the event coder has been made
available publicly by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.3 This event coder, known
as ACCENT, searches for the following information: a sender, a receiver, an action type, and a
time stamp. The set of action types covered include activities between dyads such as “Occupy
territory”, “Use conventional force”, and “Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions”. Then, the
ontology provides rules through which the parsed story is coded. An example of a coded news
story fitting this last category is:
“President Bill Clinton has imposed sanctions on the Taliban religious faction that
controls Afghanistan for its support of suspected terrorist Osama bin Laden, the White
House said Tuesday.”
In this example, the actor designated as sending the action is the United States and the
actor receiving it is Afghanistan. Dyadic measurements such as these are available for 249
countries, and the dataset is updated regularly. Currently, data up until March 2016 has been
made publicly available on the ICEWS dataverse.
Our sample for this analysis focuses on monthly level interactions between countries in the
international system from 2005 to 2012.4 To measure conflict from this database we focus on
what is often referred to as the “material conflict” variable. This variable is taken from the “quad
variable” framework developed by Duval and Thompson (1980). Schrodt and Yonamine (2013)
3Details at http://bit.ly/2nS4nBU.4The ICEWS data extends to 2016 but we end at 2012 due to temporal coverage constraints amongother covariates that we have incorporated into the model. 10
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defines the type of events that get drawn into this category as those involving, “Physical acts of
a conflictual nature, including armed attacks, destruction of property, assassination, etc.”.
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Figure 4. Network depiction of ICEWS Material Conflict events for January 2005(top) and December 2012 (bottom).
Figure 4 visualizes the material conflict variable as a network, specifically, we provide snap-
shots of events between dyads along this relational dimension in January 2005 and December
2012. The size of the nodes correspond to how active countries are in the network, and each
node is colored by its geographic position. An edge between two nodes designates that at least11
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one material conflict event has taken place between that dyad, and arrows indicate the sender
and receiver. Thicker edges indicate a greater count of material conflict events between a dyad.
In both snapshots, the United States is highly involved in conflict events occurring in the
system both in 2005 and 2012. Additionally, other major powers such as Russia and the Great
Britain are also frequently involved. Some notable changes are visible in the network. While
in 2005 Iraq was highly involved in material conflict events by 2012 Syria became more active.
Last, there is a significant amount of clustering by geography in this network. Conflict involving
Latin American countries is relatively infrequent but when it does occur, it seems to primarily
involve countries within the region.
Parameters with direct effect. What variables have a direct effect on the level of conflict
between countries? There are a number of the standard explanations provided in the conflict
literature. Inertia and reprocity top the list. Conflict in period t is affected by what occurred
previously in period t − 1. This is autoregressive dependence. The expectation is that a dyad
engaged in conflict in the previous period is more likely to be engaged in conflict in the next.
A lagged reciprocity parameter embodies the common argument that if country j receives
conflict from i in period t, that in period t + 1 j may retaliate by sending conflict to i. The
argument that reciprocity is likely to occur in conflict networks is certainly not novel, and has
its roots in well known theories involving cooperation and conflict between states (Richardson,
1960; Choucri and North, 1972; Rajmaira and Ward, 1990; Goldstein, 1992).
A number of exogenous explanations have often been used to explain conflicts between
dyads. One of the most common relates to the role of geography. Apart from conflict involving
major powers, conflict between countries that are geographically proximate is typical (Bremer,
1992; Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Carter and Goemans, 2011). Figure 4 provides some evidence for
the tendency of conflict to occur between countries within the same region. The minimum,
logged distance between the dyads operationalizes this covariate.5
One of the most well developed arguments linking conflict between dyads to domestic in-
stitutions involves the idea of the democratic peace. The specific vein of this argument that
5Minimum distance estimation was conducted using the CShapes package (Weidmann, Kuse andGleditsch, 2010). 12
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has found the most support is the idea that democracies are unlikely to go to war with one
another (Small and Singer, 1976; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Russett and Oneal, 2001). Arguments
for why democracies may have more peaceful relations between themselves range from how
they share certain norms that make them less likely to engage in conflict to others hypothe-
sizing that democratic leaders are better able to demonstrate resolve thus reducing conflict
resulting from incomplete information (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Fearon, 1995). To operational-
ize this argument, we construct a binary indicator that is one when both countries in the dyad
are democratic.6
We also control for whether or not a pair of countries are allied to one another using data
from the Correlates of War (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004).7 Typically, one would expect that states
allied to one another are less likely to engage in conflict. Another common control in the con-
flict literature is the level of trade between a pair of countries. We estimate trade flows between
countries using the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 2012). Incorporating the level of trade between countries speaks to a
long debate on the role that economic interdependencies may play in mitigating the risk of
conflict between states (Barbieri, 1996; Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001).8
The last set of measures we use to predict dyadic conflict are derived from another ICEWS
quad variable. Verbal cooperation counts the occurrence of statements expressing a desire
to cooperate from one country to another.9 We include a lagged and reciprocal version of
this variable to our specification. This monthly level measure of cooperation between states
provides us with a thermometer measure of the relations between states that is measured at a
low level of temporal aggregation.
6We define a country as democratic if its polity score is greater than or equal to seven according tothe Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).7We consider a pair of countries allied to one another if they share amutual defense treaty, neutralitypact, or entente.8The extant literature has employed a variety of parameterizations to test this hypothesis. At times,a measure of trade dependence is calculated and at others just a simple measure of the trade flowsbetween a pair of countries. We show results for the latter parameterization but results are consistentif we utilize a measure of trade dependence.9An example of a verbal cooperation event sent from Turkey to Portugal is the following: “Portugalwill support Turkey’s efforts to become a full member of the European Community, Portuguese President MarioSoares said on Tuesday.” 13
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Parameters defining influence patterns. The novel feature of the SIR model is its ability to
explain influence patterns as a function of an underlying regression model estimated jointly
with the parameters directly modeling yij through the iterative procedure described in the pre-
vious section.
Thus using the SIR model we can answer the following types of questions:
• Are actions directed at the one country at time t − 1 predictive of the actions directed
towards another at time t?
• What characteristics can explain why the actions of the one country at time t − 1 are
predictive of the actions of another country at time t?
The first covariate added to the influence specification, is simply a control for the distance
between countries.10 A negative effect for the distance parameter in the case of sender influ-
ence would indicate that countries are likely to send conflictual actions to the same countries
that their neighbors are sending conflictual actions too. In the case of receiver influence, a neg-
ative effect would indicate that countries are likely to be targeted by the same set of countries
that their neighbors are receiving conflictual interactions from.
An interesting argument that has received continuing attention in the political science liter-
ature is the role that alliances play in either mitigating or increasing the level of conflict in the
international system. A number of scholars have argued that in the case of a conflict, a coun-
try’s allies will join in to honor their commitments thus increasing the risks for a multiparty
interstate conflict (Snyder, 1984; Leeds, 2003; Vasquez and Rundlett, 2016). We would find evi-
dence for this argument if the ally parameter in the case of sender influence was positive, as
that would indicate that countries are more likely to initiate or increase the level of conflict with
countries that their allies are in conflict with.
Last, we include measures for the level of trade and verbal cooperation between countries.
Interpretations for how the effects of these covariates may play out follows a similar framework
to what has been described above. Table 1 summarizes each of the covariates used to estimate
the social influence regression on the material conflict variable from ICEWS.
10This is operationalized similarly as above using data from CShapes. 14
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Zijt
Material Conflictij,t−1 Allyij,t−1Material Conflictji,t−1 Log(Trade)ij,t−1Distanceij,t−1 Verbal Cooperationij,t−1Joint Democracyij,t−1 Verbal Cooperationji,t−1
Wijt
Distanceij,t−1Allyij,t−1Log(Trade)ij,t−1Verbal Cooperationij,t−1
Table 1. Model specification summary for social influence regression. Top rowshows covariates used to estimate direct effects and bottom sender and receiverinfluence.
Parameter Estimates. Figure 5 depicts the parameter estimates using a set of coefficient
plots.11 On the left, we summarize the estimates of the direct effect parameters. As expected,
greater levels of conflict between a dyad in the last period are associated with greater levels of
conflict in the present. This speaks to a finding common in the conflict literature regarding the
persistence of conflicts between dyads (Brandt et al., 2000). We also find evidence that coun-
tries retaliate to conflict aggressively, though this effect is imprecisely measured. In terms of
our exogenous parameters, the level of conflict between a dyad is negatively associated with
the distance between them, a finding that aligns well with the extant literature.
Additionally, as is typical in the extant literature we find that jointly democratic dyads are
unlikely to engage in conflict with one another. Surprisingly, however, the level of trade be-
tween countries is positively associated with the level of conflict. The divergence of this finding
with some of the extant literature may be a result of a variety of factors, such as our use of
a measure of conflict that has much greater variance than the militarized interstate disputes
measurement from the Correlates of War dataset. Or, it may be a consequence of having the
network dependencies more fully specified for the first time.
11Convergence diagnostics are presented in Figure A1 of the Appendix. 15
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Figure 5. Left-most plot shows results for the direct effect parameters and thetop-right plot represents results for the sender influence, and bottom-right re-ceiver influence parameters. Points in each of the plots represents the averageeffect for the parameter and the width the 90 and 95% confidence intervals.Dark shades of blue and red indicate that the parameter is significant at a 95%confidence interval and lighter shades a 90% confidence interval. Parametersthat are not significant are shaded in grey.
The right-most plots focuses what determines sender (top) and receiver (bottom) influence
patterns. Interestingly, the alliance sender influence parameter has a positive effect, indicating
that countries tend to initiate greater levels of conflict with countries that their allies were fight-
ing in the previous period. This finding is in line with arguments in the extant literature about16
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the role that alliance relationships may play in leading to more conflict in the international sys-
tem (Siverson and King, 1980; Leeds, 2005).
Additionally, countries are likely to send conflict to those with whom their verbal cooperation
partners are initiating or increasing conflict with. This finding is interesting as it highlights that
countries making cooperative statements regarding a particular country i, actually go beyond
those statements in later periods to supporting i by initiating conflict with those that i was
in conflict with. Trade flows, on the other hand, are associated with having a negative effect,
implying that countries are not likely, and in fact somewhat unlikely, to follow their trading
partners into conflict.
Receiver influence patterns are similarly determined. Trade flows and verbal cooperation
have similar effects, though the interpretation here for trade is that countries are unlikely to
be targeted by those that target their trading partners. Interestingly, the distance effect on
the receiver influence side is more precisely measured, implying that geographically proximate
countries are more likely to receive conflict from a similar set of countries.
Visualizing Dependence Patterns. Based on the sender and receiver influence parameter
estimates, Figure 6 provides a visual summary of the type of dependence patterns that are
implied in the context of the material conflict model estimated in the previous section.
The linear combination of our influence parameter estimates (α), and the design array con-
taining sender influence variables (wijt) are used to visualize the sender dependence patterns
between a pair of countries (aijt): aijt = α>wijt. The resulting sender and receiver dependence
pattern are shown in Figure 6 for June 2007.12 For the visualization on the left [right], edges
between countries indicate that greater likelihood to send [receive] conflictual events to [from]
the same countries. Countries are colored by their relative geographic position and node size
corresponds to the number of influence relationships the country shares.
Since these dependence patterns are estimated directly from the model results that are pre-
sented in Figure 5, the patterns implied by that model are manifest in these visualizations. One
12A lengthier table of visualizations for additional time periods is shown in Figure A2 of the Appendix.17
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of the more notable findings from the sender influence model is the role that alliance relation-
ships play, and this effect is striking. For example, the USA shares sender influence ties with
a number of Western European countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom, the USA
also is more likely to send conflict to actors that Australia, South Korea and Japan have engaged
in material conflict with, and many of these countries are likely to do the same.
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Figure 6. Network visualization of influence patterns as estimated by the socialinfluence regression model for June 2007. Nodes are colored by their relativegeographic position and are sized by the number of influence relationships thatthey receive and send.
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A predictor of receiver influence patterns is the distance between countries. Countries are
more likely to be targeted by the same set of countries as their neighbors. This pattern mani-
fests itself in the right-most visualization in Figure 6, where we find clumps of countries, such
as Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, clustering together.
Performance Comparison. A common and important argument for employing a network
based approach is that it aids in better accounting for the data generating process underly-
ing relational data structures.
Thus, in this case, the network approach should actually better predict conflict in an out-of-
sample test. To put the performance of this model in context, we compare it to a standard
GLM that does not account for dependence patterns in the network, but is similarly parameter-
ized. Additionally, given the recent interest in machine learning methods as tools for prediction
within the social sciences we compare the performance against a generalized boosted model
(GBM).
Boosting methods have become a popular approach in the machine learning to ensemble
over decision tree models in a sequential manner. At each iteration, a new model is trained
with respect to the error of the ensemble at that point. Friedman (2001) greatly extended the
learning procedure underlying boosting algorithms, by modifying the approach to choose new
models at every iteration so that they would bemaximally correlated with the negative gradient
of some loss function relevant to the ensemble. In the case of a squared-error loss function,
this would correspond to sequentially fitting the residuals. We use a generalized version of
this model developed by Ridgeway (2012) that extends this framework to the estimation of a
variety of distribution types—in our case, a Poisson regression model. In general, these types
of models have been shown to give substantial predictive advantage over alternative methods,
such as GLM, and should provide a useful point of comparison.13
To compare these approaches we first utilize a cross-validation procedure. This involves first
randomly dividing T time points in our relational array into k = 10 sets and within each set we
set randomly exclude five time slices from our material conflict array. We then run our models
13The R gbm package on CRAN implements this estimator (Ridgeway, 2012). 19
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and predict the five missing slices from the estimated parameters. Proper scoring rules are
used to compare predictions. Scoring rules evaluate forecasts through the assignment of a
numerical score based on the predictive distribution and on the actual value of the dependent
variable. Czado, Gneiting and Held (2009) discuss a number of such rules that can be used
for count data: Brier, Dawid-Sebastiani, Logarithmic, and Spherical scores.14 For each of these
rules, lower values on the metric indicate better performance.
Dawid-Sebastiani RMSE
Logarithmic Brier Spherical
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Generalized Boosted
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Figure 7. Performance comparison based on randomly excluding time slicesfrom the material conflict array. Colors designate the different models, and theaverage score across the 10-fold cross validation is designated by a circle and therange by a horizontal line.
Figure 7 illustrates differences in the performance between the social influence model, GLM,
and GBM across the scoring rules mentioned above and a more standard metric, the RMSE. In
the case of each of these metrics we find GLM performs the worst and that the social influence
model performs the best.
14Details are provided in the Appendix. 20
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Recently, conflict scholars have become interested in generating forecasts from their models
(Pevehouse and Goldstein, 1999; de Mesquita, 2009; Brandt, Freeman and Schrodt, 2014; Hegre,
Høyland and Nygård, 2015; Ward, 2016). and to assess the performance of their model instead
of taking a cross-validation approach they often just predict out some number of years. We
perform such an exercise as well by dividing up our sample into a training and test set, where
the test set corresponds to the last x periods in the data that we have available. We vary x from
two to five. For instance, when x = 5 we are leaving the last five years of data for validation.
Results for this analysis are shown in Figure 8 and there again we find that the social influence
model has better out of sample predictive performance than the alternatives we test here.
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Figure 8. Performance comparison based on randomly excluding the last twoto five periods of the material conflict array. Colors and shapes designate thedifferent models, and the score when excluding x number of periods is shown.
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CONCLUSION
Both measuring influence and determining the drivers of it are topics of perennial interest in
network analysis and political science. Within political science, determining whether and how
actors within relational systems influence one another is a topic of particular interest in regards
to deriving measures surrounding the relative “power” of states. Though much past work has
drawn upon explanations based on power to assess world events, extant operationalizations
of this concept can be improved.
The standard approach of assessing the relative power of a pair of states is derived by calcu-
lating the ratio of their material capabilities (e.g., Slantchev 2004; Reed et al. 2008; Butler and
Gates 2009; Gartzke and Weisiger 2014). The availability of quantitative data on material char-
acteristics of states (e.g., population, iron and steel production, military size) was to influence
greatly the scholarship in this area. Currently, many scholars continue to rely on indices such
as the Correlates of War’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) as a way of assessing
power (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). For the most part, this has pushed scholarly consid-
eration of power into a capabilities direction, rather than a direction in which power was seen
as relational.
These approaches have implicitly assumed that power is material and fungible. If China has
more capabilities than India, it has more power. If India and Japan together have more capabili-
ties than China, then they havemore power. Yet, relying on these types of measures ignores the
nuances of regional as well as global interactions, and disregards the contexts in which states
interact. Further, the narrow interpretation of power characterized by purely detracts from a
more relevant question regarding relational data, namely, how do the actions of actors within a
network influence the actions of others. Through using the approach we have introduced here
scholars can continue to test theories regarding the role that alliances or trade flows may play
in influencing states, but can move towards doing so within a network context.
The work that we have done is also relevant for the networks literature. Discussions around
measurements of influence often begin and end with the use of various centrality measures.
Yet, centrality measures just provide a representation of how “important” a node is within a
22
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network, and do not detail how a pair of nodes might be influencing the actions of one an-
other. Further centrality measures for the most part are just descriptive tools. Of course one
can shift towards using alternative approaches such as latent variable models, but these ap-
proaches cast little light on exogenous attributes that might be shaping how actors within a
system influence one another in a longitudinal context. The approach that we introduce here
is an extension of earlier work involving the bilinear autoregression model, and we have now
simplified it into a rank one regression model. This approach allows us to estimate the role
that nodal and dyadic attributes may play in how dyads influence one another, and because
this approach is estimated within a GLM framework it is readily extendable to a variety of other
settings.
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APPENDIX
Visualization of convergence for direct (blue), sender influence (green), and receiver influence
(red) parameters.
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Figure A1. Convergence diagnostics for the social influence regression modelon material conflict.
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Convergence.
Influence Dynamics. Visualization of influence effects for select time points from dynamic
social influence regression model.
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Figure A2. Influence relationships
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Scoring Rules for Count Data. Scoring rules are penalties s(y, P ) introduced with P being
the predictive distribution and y the observed value. The goal of researchers interested in
prediction is to minimize the expectation of these scores, which is typically calculated by taking
the average:
S = 1n
∑n
i=1 s(yi, Pi),
where yi refers to the ith observed count and Pi the ith predictive distribution. A set of
proper scoring rules as defined by Czado, Gneiting and Held (2009) are shown in the list below.
For each of these rules, f(y) denotes the predictive probability mass function. µˆ and σˆ refer to
the mean and standard deviation of the predictive distribution.
• Dawid-Sebastiani score: s(y, P ) = (y−µˆσˆ )2 + 2× log(σˆ)
• Logarithmic score: s(y, P ) = −log(f(y))
• Brier score: s(y, P ) = −2f(y) +∑k f2(k)
• Spherical score: s(y, P ) = f(y√∑
k f
2(k)
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